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Abstract: This article looks at the human rights protection in transitional
post-uprising Tunisia, from 2011 to 2017, offering insights into the willingness
to both protect human rights and build capacity in Tunisia. It focuses on the
establishment of an adequate legal framework in Tunisia, with particular
attention being paid to the constitution-making process and, on the establish-
ment, the strengthening of certain institutional capacities, such as the con-
stitutional court and the Truth and Dignity Commission. The article first gives
a brief historical overview of the human rights situation in Tunisia. This is
followed by an analysis of the willingness and capacity to protect human
rights in post-uprising transitional Tunisia, in both the 2011–2014 and 2014–
2017 periods.This article is based on evidence from a series of semi-structured
interviews I conducted with the key political actors from various political
parties, and actors from NGOs working on human rights, during field
research in Tunisia in October-November 2017, supplemented by secondary
literature.
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Introduction
The popular uprising in Tunisia, which started in December 2010 and spread
across the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, was mainly driven by
the failure of the state to respect, protect and ensure human rights1
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1 This article takes the International Bill of Human Rights consisting of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as the source of international
human rights standards.
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(Richardson-Little 2015, 158). In reaction to years of systematic human rights
violations, protestors employed the language of international human rights and
demanded “freedom of expression”, “democracy” and the application of
“human rights” (Monshipouri 2014, 63–64), challenging the existing authori-
tarian arrangement (Mokhtari 2015) and ousting the long-standing repressive
Ben Ali government. These events have not only proved to political actors that
human rights and freedoms are an articulation of human nature rather than
artificial state constructions (Hamd 2016, 1–2), but have also raised hopes for
the improvement of human rights in the country. Human rights have become a
more frequent topic of discourse as political actors have repeatedly referred to
them to claim legitimate authority and popular support (Odysseos and Selmeczi
2015, 1033–1035), regardless of their political background or former positions
on the issue.
Tunisia is most commonly described as the rare success story of the so-
called Arab Spring and is considered to be the country influenced most posi-
tively by the uprisings (Badria 2016, 567; Yerkes 2018). Although Tunisia’s eight-
year-long transition has faced numerous challenges and obstacles, such as
terrorist attacks, economic crises, political deadlock and conflict between secu-
larists and Islamists, its legal and political systems have seen extreme changes
during this period (Yerkes 2018). The country has experienced a comparatively
successful transition process, with strengthened civil rights and fundamental
freedoms, flourishing activist movements and relatively stable political institu-
tions. Two years after the uprisings, Freedom House upgraded Tunisia’s status
from “Not Free” to “Partly Free” because of its significantly improved human
rights record (Freedom House 2013). Two years later, Freedom House designated
Tunisia as the only free country in the region due to its adoption of a progressive
constitution, improvements in governance, and the holding of free and fair
parliamentary and presidential elections (Freedom House 2015). Reports pub-
lished by Human Rights Watch after the uprisings have also praised the coun-
try’s flourishing human rights record (Human Rights Watch 2015, 2016a, 2017).
The positive outcome of a democratic transition, with regard to the protec-
tion of human rights, is conditioned by a combination of several domestic and
international factors, including regime type, legal structure, an independent
judiciary and a vibrant civil society (Landman 2005). Tunisia’s comparatively
successful transitional process is mostly explained by its historical and cul-
tural background, highly educated population, a large middle class, weak
military, vibrant civil society, low strategic importance, and homogenous
population. The capacity and willingness of a state are also regarded as
significant key determinants for the improvement of human rights in a transi-
tional country.
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Capacity, Willingness and Human Rights Protection
Thomas Risse points out that many transitional countries on a path to democra-
tization have committed themselves to international human rights, but human
rights are nevertheless violated because institutional capacity is lacking. He
underlines the significance of a state’s institutional capacity to protect human
rights and claims that in most cases violations of human rights are not due to a
lack of willingness but of capacity (Risse 2018, 139). Indeed, institutional capa-
cities are needed to both protect human rights and translate human rights
demands from the streets into decision-making processes (Hamd 2016, 3–4).
However, the willingness of political actors to improve human rights should not
be taken for granted considering that commitments in this regard might be
extremely costly. Moreover, for human rights protections to be effective, both
institutional capacity and willingness are necessary (Anaya-Munoz and Murdie
2018). In fact, for transitional countries like Tunisia, willingness is a more vital
condition as it also determines the country’s capacity to build effective human
rights protections. Tunisia made remarkably effective efforts in establishing demo-
cratic institutions in the first three years following the uprisings. However, after
seven years of revolution there are serious signs of a slowdown in the democratic
transition process and a setback in the form of a lack of willingness both to
protect human rights and, more importantly, to build the necessary capacity. In
some cases, even the effectively established institutions have been hindered or
slowed down by political actors.
State capacity is defined based on the notion of ability, and refers to the
material and human resources of a state giving it the ability to make, implement
and enforce rules and regulations (Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno, and Robinson 2015;
Anaya-Munoz and Murdie 2018, 8–9). Capacity building in the field of human
rights mostly refers to the establishment of an adequate legal framework and the
establishment and strengthening of institutional capacities and civil society.
These three elements are key to the protection and enforcement of human rights.
Compared to capacity and capacity building, willingness is more challenging to
conceptualise as it is mostly taken for granted and not explicitly studied in the
human rights literature. For the sake of this paper, willingness refers to the
preference and intent to achieve a given outcome, and to act accordingly (Post,
Raile, and Rile 2010; Anaya-Munoz and Murdie 2018, 9). It includes the preference
and intent to build the needed capacity for the protection of human rights such as
a legal framework, institutional capacities, and civil society. Willingness in the
political actors can also be observed by their statements in addition to their
behaviour. Often statements of political actors can be rhetorical or tactical con-
cessions driven by strategic calculations (Anaya-Munoz and Murdie 2018). Thus, it
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is significant when signals given by the actors regarding human rights protections
relate to costly commitments or a consensus which has some serious effect on
political interests and longstanding ideologies.
This article looks at the human rights protection in transitional post-
uprising Tunisia, from 2011 to 2017, offering insights into the willingness to
both protect human rights and build capacity in Tunisia. It focuses on the
establishment of an adequate legal framework in Tunisia, with particular
attention being paid to the constitution-making process and, on the establish-
ment, the strengthening of certain institutional capacities, such as the consti-
tutional court and the Truth and Dignity Commission. The paper illustrates that
during the uprisings, from 2011 to 2014, despite the extraordinary challenges in
transitional Tunisia, the willingness to protect human rights and create the
necessary legal and institutional frameworks for the protection of human rights
was high. This was also mirrored in the positive reports published by the
human rights organisations, and in the extraordinary levels of readiness of
various political actors to reach a consensus on controversial issues, such as
the place of religion in the country’s legal and political system. This period has
also been described by many Tunisians as a period of extreme freedoms and
liberties.2 However, the period starting in 2014 shows signs of a serious decline
in willingness and capacity building to safeguard human rights. Since 2014,
the Tunisian government has failed in the establishment of the institutions
necessary to effectively protect human rights, which in turn has negatively
affected the human rights situation in the country. The return of many faces
from the old regime to the political scene with the victory of Nidaa Tounes in
the 2014 elections was one of the main reasons why the government has shown
less interest in capacity building. Moreover, the ongoing and growing eco-
nomic instability has also restricted the government’s ability to establish
institutions needed for the protection of human rights, and security concerns
have given rise to legal and institutional measures impacting human rights
negatively.
The article first gives a brief historical overview of the human rights situa-
tion in Tunisia. This is followed by an analysis of the willingness and capacity to
protect human rights in post-uprising transitional Tunisia, in both the 2011–2014
and 2014–2017 periods. As Ennahda became the most important force in
Tunisian politics after the uprisings, this paper pays special attention to their
position and action on human rights and capacity building issues during the
initial 2011–2014 time period, particularly with regard to constitution-making.
2 Interviews conducted in November 2017 with constitutional law professor Said Kais, Youth
Can president Zyna Mejri, and Ennahda deputy Mahrezia Labidi.
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The focus of the second period, 2014–2017, is more on the efforts of government
officials to block and/or establish the legal and institutional capacities to protect
human rights. This article is based on evidence from a series of semi-structured
interviews I conducted with the key political actors from various political par-
ties, including: Ennahda, Nidaa Tounes; the Popular Front; and actors from
NGOs working on human rights, such as Albawsala, I Watch and Youth Can,
during field research in Tunisia in October-November 2017, supplemented by
secondary literature.
Human Rights in Tunisia during Bourgouiba
and Ben Ali Era
Tunisia became a sovereign state in 1956 after a short war of independence against
France. After gaining independence the country was briefly ruled by a king, before
he was replaced by the first elected president Habib Bourguiba, leader of the
nationalist Neo-Dustur party (Entelis 2007, 520). Bourguiba ruled the country for
31 years and turned the country towards the west, enacting several reforms to
create a secular and modern country. These included restructuring the Tunisian
court system under a secular model, reforming the personal status law legalizing
divorce, authorizing abortion, giving free access to contraception, prohibiting
polygamy, setting a minimum age for marriage and controlling Islamic institutions
such as the Zaytuna Mosque (Borg 2017; Andrieu 2016, 265). Bourguiba’s policies to
modernise the country by controlling religion entailed the violation of religious
freedoms. Many of his modernisation policies took aim at religious practices and
included raising objections to the Ramadan feast on the basis of cost and fighting
against the veiling of women. In fact, Bourgouiba was an authoritarian and
repressive ruler and during his presidency, increasing repression of human rights
and freedoms was accompanied by growing political opposition. Opposition move-
ments, including leftists and Islamists, suffered human rights violations during
Bourguibas’ presidency. In the 1970s the leftist opposition was a victim of
Bourgouibas’ authoritarian rule. During this period leftist student movements
and labour unions were almost completely dismantled. In the 1980s the
Movement of the Islamist Tendency (MTI) – founded in 1981 by Rached
Ghannouchi and changing its name to Ennahda in 1989 – was the government’s
main target and many of its activists were arrested and tortured, including the MIT
president and founder (Andrieu 2016, 266; Willis 2012: 164–166).
Bourguiba was removed from power in 1987 through a bloodless coup
instigated by prime minister Zine el Abidine Ben Ali. When Ben Ali seized
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power, he declared human rights to be the fundamental duty of his government
(Graenzer 1999, 126), and stated that the purpose of his succession was to
preserve and expand Tunisian human rights. He masterfully applied human
rights discourses to justify the coup (Graenzer 1999, 126). However, during his
regime, the country was ruled by a centralized state power in an unaccountable
presidential system with a weak parliament and judiciary. Constitutional guar-
antees of human rights existed but lacked the support of strong institutional
guarantees (Johnson 2015, 1049–1050).
In the first years of his rule the country experienced relative political
liberalisation and formerly-suppressed elites and civil society groups includ-
ing international organisations experienced an era of freedom3 (Graenzer
1999, 126–132; Mednicoff 2003, 86). He also legalised Ennahda and allowed
the party to participate in the 1989 elections. Several international treaties4
were also signed and ratified, and thousands of political prisoners were
granted amnesties. However, this so-called era of liberalisation was in fact
a series of limited, tactical concessions that lasted only until Ben Ali had
consolidated his power and Islamist activism had been revived and started to
threaten secular Arab politics in Tunisia. After that, Ben Ali turned Tunisia
into a police state, fiercely violating the rights of the Tunisian people. He
introduced political and legal measures to restrict the activities of national
human rights groups and put limits on the freedoms of the press, association,
and information (Andrieu 2016, 266; Anderson 2011; El-Khawas 2012, 2–3). In
the 1990s, the targets of his repressive rule were mainly Islamists and
Ennahda, which had been banned and its members imprisoned, tortured or
forced into exile. However, other opponents or independent elements of civil
society including human rights activists were also victims of human rights
violations including restrictions on their freedom of expression, torture and
arbitrary execution (Andrieu 2016, 267; Murphy 2012, 2–5). The Tunisian
League of Human Rights (LTDH), which upon its establishment in 1977 was
the first significant indigenous human rights organisation in the region,
dissolved itself in 1992 in reaction to Ben Ali’s repressive politics5
(Mednicof 2003, 87). LTDH Secretary General Khemais Chammari was arrested
in 1995 together with the leader of the Movement of Social Democrats
3 For instance, Amnesty International was permitted as a legitimate organisation.
4 Including the Convention against Torture (CAT), the Convention on the Elimination of all
forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC)
5 LTDH was re-founded in 1994 but with an agenda closely conforming to the government
position.
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because of a letter addressed to Ben Ali complaining about the restrictive
politics of the government (El-Khawas 2012: 2–5). The war on terror after 9/11
also helped the Tunisian police state justify or conceal severe human rights
violations (Andrieu 2016, 267).
Human rights violations have been routine in Tunisia since independence;
however, at the same time the language of rights has also long been important
to Tunisian political discourse (Borg 2017). Both leaders, Bourgouiba and Ben
Ali, tried to maintain the image of Tunisia as a secular and modern country.
They continued to control human rights discourse, but at the same time
repressed all forms of political competition, critical media and human rights
activism in the country (Huellen 2013). Tunisia was particularly praised by the
international community as an example with regard to its progressive women’s
rights in contrast to other Muslim countries in the region. However, the author-
itarian regimes in Tunisia supported only the rights of secular and well-educated
women and allowed only state-monopolized discourses of women’s rights (in
other words, state feminism) whereas independent feminist women’s organisa-
tions were suppressed (Borg 2017). For western countries Tunisia was a reliable
partner and a safeguard against Islamist movements. Thus, no coercive mea-
sures or sanctions were taken against Tunisia although international human
rights law norms relating to civil and political rights were frequently denied to
its citizens (Huellen van 2013).
Arab Uprisings and Human Rights in Tunisia
The Tunisian revolution, which started on December 17, 2010 and spread to
other countries in the region, led to regime change on January 14, 2011.
Tunisia has subsequently experienced years of significant political and insti-
tutional change. Compared to uprisings in other countries in the region,
Tunisia was more successful in forming effective parties, holding competitive
elections, and establishing other institutions necessary for democratic transi-
tion (Bellin 2011, 6), as it has more favourable conditions for democratic
transition including high levels of literacy, a large middle class, an ethnically
and religiously homogeneous population, a small and politically inactive
military, and a vibrant civil society. In particular, the rapidly flourishing
civil society in the post-uprisings era played an important role in the success
of transition by monitoring the government and protecting human rights. The
best known achievement of the civil society organisations contributing to the
success of the transition was the role of the National Quartet in brokering a
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compromise between secularists and Islamists, which was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize in 2015 (Yerkes 2018). Many other CSOs have played important
roles in the positive development of human rights in Tunisia, such as: Al-
Bawsala monitoring the activity of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA)
and informing the public about its activities; I Watch monitoring the govern-
ment on administrative and financial corruption; and Manish Masameh (I
shall not forgive) lobbying the public against the economic reconciliation
giving amnesty to former regime officials involved in major corruption
cases (Chakroun 2018; El’Manai 2018).
Following the uprisings, Tunisia was able to take several effective steps to
build capacity and to make the necessary changes in its legal and institutional
frameworks to protect human rights. The most important steps in this regard
were the adoption of the 2014 Constitution, the establishment of independent
commissions – including the Truth and Dignity Commission, the Commission
against Torture, and the Human Rights Commission – and the approval of bills
which, for example, guaranteed the right to access information and fight vio-
lence against women. The establishment of these institutions provided the
country with the basic necessary capacity to protect human rights, and a high
degree of willingness together with this new institutional capacity gave rise to a
flourishing human rights records in the country. As a result, the post-revolution
era has not only put human rights at the centre of the country’s continuous
struggle for a democratic transition but also provided Tunisian citizens with
liberties and freedoms which had been denied to them by authoritarian regimes
before the uprisings (Human Rights Watch 2015, 2016a). Certainly, there are still
serious challenges to the protection of human rights present in the country,
which have been carried over from the previous regimes. In particular, human
rights violations like torture, and mistreatment by the security forces still con-
tinue. However, the main difference in the post-uprisings Tunisia is that these
violations are not institutionalised, as during the previous regime.
Human rights activist and Constituent Assembly Member Fadhel Moussa
described the dramatic improvement in human rights after the uprisings with
the following words:
The people expressed their desire to change the political situation in our country, espe-
cially the human rights situation including civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights as stipulated in two international conventions of human rights. We can say that
Tunisians experienced a huge improvement in their civil and political rights, and Tunisia is
today a democratic country with regard to human rights criteria.6
6 Interview conducted with Fadhel Moussa in November 2017.
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Huge Popularity of Human Rights Issues after the Uprisings
One of the key gains during the transitional period in Tunisia was that human
rights became hugely popular after the uprisings. Human rights became the
number one political and social topic in the country and post-uprising Tunisia
experienced an extensive use of rights discourse, regardless of ideology or
religious differences (Borg 2017, 455; Stephens and Callaway 2014, 426).
Political actors, irrespective of their political background, conveyed their will-
ingness and readiness to protect human rights in the country. Although, these
statements alone cannot be taken as evidence of their willingness to protect
human rights, they give some indication in this regard, particularly if these
statements were about politically or ideologically sensitive issues which might
have costly consequences. Moreover, these statements influenced Tunisian
understandings of human rights and they raised awareness of the issues, affect-
ing how human rights advocacy and enforcement strategies were subsequently
designed (Hamd 2016).
The executive director of Al-bawsala7 (a non-profit non-governmental orga-
nisation established under Tunisian law) Selim Kharrat described this atmo-
sphere of popular support for human rights in post-uprising Tunisia with the
following words:
The most important change is related to the general mind-set of the political elite and
public opinion concerning human rights. Human rights just after the 2011 uprisings
became the main topic of political debate. Every political party is ensuring that they
respect human rights.8
The atmosphere of the post-revolution era undeniably forced political actors
to legitimise themselves by making statements about the protection of human
rights. In some cases, this meant that they had to tackle issues which are not
in line with their ideological background or political interests. This behaviour
in particular provides an excellent insight into the willingness of political
actors to protect human rights, as these are mostly in areas which carry some
political costs. In this context, looking at the statements of one of the most
significant key actors in post-uprising Tunisia, namely Ennahda, is helpful in
illustrating their willingness to protect human rights. It should be empha-
sised that the political behaviour of Islamist parties and their statements has
7 The organisation is independent of political influence and monitors legislative and executive
proceedings, advocates for fundamental rights and individual freedoms, and assists in the
development of citizens’ initiatives (https://www.albawsala.com/en/presentation).
8 Interview conducted with Selim Kharrat in November 2017.
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been one of the most significant determinants of how post-uprising transi-
tions have evolved in the MENA region. Several Islamist parties, such as
Ennahda in Tunisia and the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, became
central actors with majority seats in parliament, and faced great challenges
including the need to rethink their ideologies and strategies, and the question
of how to handle peoples’ expectations after the uprisings (Guazzone 2013,
30). Ennahda’s electoral victory and its presence in the political scene after
the revolution caused deep concerns and fears of Islamization, which might
in turn also negatively affect human rights in the country. These concerns
were increased by Ennahda’s attempt to position Sharia in the constitution as
a source of legislation as well as by the controversial speeches of Ennahda
parliament members, such as Sadiq Shurus, who called for freedoms, which
might be used to justify the insult of Islam, to be restricted (Elin 2013).
However, it should be emphasised that Ennahda is not a homogenous move-
ment. Although the movement includes more radical members who resemble
Salafists, one can say that Ennahda has a moderate political ideology. Its
leaders, especially Ghannouchi, have been at the forefront of Islamic thinkers
who are progressively bridging the idea of an Islamic state with the require-
ments of democratic processes, particularly by linking individual and group
rights to the concept of citizenship rather than religious membership.
Ennahda’s 2011 electoral program also stated the need to establish a ‘civilian
state’ (dawla madaniyya), which is “responsible for the respect of public and
individual liberties” (Guazzone 2013, 44–45; Pickard 2011: 644). Furthermore,
at the tenth congress of the party in 2016, its political and religious activities
were separated and “political Islam” was left behind in favour of embracing
“Muslim democracy” (Feuer 2016).
With regard to human rights, post-uprising Tunisia faced an intense
debate between Islamists and secularists over the universality and cultural
relativity of rights, concerning whether they were consistent with cultural
and religious beliefs and practice in the country. As already mentioned there
were widespread fears that a religious interpretation of human rights would
move Tunisia away from universal human rights and push the country
towards a culturally relativist approach. However, in spite of these conflict-
ing diverse interests, political actors - with the help of civil society - were
able to reach a consensus and showed willingness to contribute to the
improvement of human rights in the country. This was confirmed by former
Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki, who described the readiness of the
various political actors to engage with human rights issues with the follow-
ing words:
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With regard to human rights, we had the same will to abolish torture – don’t forget that
Ennahda [members] were the main victims of torture. I had three prime ministers and all of
them were extremely interested and committed to this way of thinking; I did not have any
problems in this regard. None of them would tell me, ‘Mr President, we have had terrorist
attacks so forget about torture. Nobody said something like that.’9
Concessions and Consensus for Successful
Constitution-Making
One of the most important steps with regard to the establishment of the legal
framework as part of the necessary capacity building in Tunisia has been the
constitution-making process. The constitution-making process in Tunisia has
reflected the diverse approaches of various parties to the critical questions of
how to guarantee the basic rights of Tunisians violated by the former regime.
The process has been marked by the constant search by all parties for consensus,
which makes the Tunisian experience distinct from other Arab uprising countries.
During this period, Ennahda has also shown a higher degree of readiness to make
concessions in the interest of consensus (Pickard 2015, 4–5; Rainer et al. 2016: 911).
It has constantly made significant concessions on previously accepted ideologies,
such as deciding to exclude a provision for Sharia as the sole source of legislation
in the draft constitution; accepting the straightforward references to “equality” in
the Article about the status of women; or granting the right to freedom of con-
science and belief (Netterstrom 2015; Marks 2014; Guazzone 2013, 38–39).
Ghannouchi regards consensus as the main reason for the success of the
Tunisian transition, which he emphasized when he said, “The Tunisian magic
formula is consensus. Nothing goes forward without consensus between the
different sides, between the opposition and coalition government and between
the different parties.”10 Ennahda showed effort in reaching consensus, even on
issues not in line with previously accepted ideologies, which gave way to a
smoother transition in Tunisia compared to other countries. As Ghannouchi
puts it:
We have discovered that in periods of transition what you need is not a simple majoritarian
democracy but a consensus based on democracy, where you take everyone with you in
forming the constitution, in shaping the future of the country … .Ennahda has given a lot
of concessions to avoid this polarization … [including on] the issue of Sharia: the mention-
ing of Sharia in the constitution was one of the things that could have divided our society.
9 Interview conducted with Moncef Marzouki in November 2017.
10 Interview with Rached Ghannouchi conducted in November 2017.
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That is why we decided to leave it out of the constitution. The constitution in the end was
passed by 97 percent of the parliament.11
The constitution-making process has been highly significant during the post-
uprising era, providing an atmosphere of constructive debate of human rights,
and giving interesting insights into the positions of Islamists and secularists on
human rights in the context of the new constitution. The constitution-making
process was dominated by a struggle between Islamic political groups – mainly
Ennahda members – and secular movements – mainly members of the Congress
for the Republic and Ettakatol – to prioritise their interests and ideologies (Rainer
et al. 2016: 911–912). One of the interviewees described the process as “a war over
the definition of terms”.12 The process lasted three years during which three drafts
were submitted to the National Constituent Assembly. Each of these drafts was the
subject of debates and amendments. After the first draft was presented in August
2012, a second draft followed on December 14, 2012 and the third draft on April 25,
2013. The drafting process was interrupted by the assassination of the secular
opposition leader, Shoukri Belaid, on February 6, 2013 (Sadek 2013: 1). Finally, the
new constitution was adopted by the National Constituent Assembly on January
26, 2014, containing provisions which broadly incorporate international human
rights law norms and was accepted by both secular and Islamist actors. The
debates on freedoms and liberties during this constitution-making process are
illustrated by Ennahda deputy Imen ben Muhammed:
The constitution includes very clear and very detailed articles about freedom and liberties.
When we discussed the chapter on freedom and liberties in the Constituent Assembly
many members of parliament said we maybe should name that part “Freedom and
Citizens’ Obligations”, but the majority wanted to name it “Freedom and Liberties”,
because what we lacked before the revolution was our freedom and liberties. And we
had a long discussion about the extent of the details. Should we have a general constitu-
tion that makes a general reference to freedom and liberties, or a constitution containing
more detail about different freedoms and liberties? In the end we agreed that we should
include all the details … and we included the famous Article 46 stating that there are no
limits to any kind of freedom or liberties by law.
During the process of drafting the new Tunisian Constitution, there was consider-
able debate between Islamist and secular movements about the role of Islamic law
in the constitution (Sadek 2013). Because of the overwhelmingly negative state of
human rights in the MENA region, a common question is whether the violation of
human rights is due to the predominance of the Islamic religion and several studies
11 Ibid.
12 Interview with Fadhel Moussa in November 2017.
12 Melek Saral
Brought to you by | School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/25/19 12:26 PM
have been conducted to explore the compatibility of human rights and Islam
(Monshipouri 1998; Mayer 2013; Sachedina 2009; Baderin 2005; Bielefeldt 2000;
Chase and Hamzawy 2006). In spite of the immense diversity of cultural, social and
political frameworks, as well as the different interpretations of Islamic thought
across the Middle East, one can hardly deny that religion significantly impacts
human rights legislation and practice in Muslim countries, and Tunisia is not an
exception in this regard. Although Tunisia has the most progressive women’s rights
in the region, its family and personal status law partially rely on Sharia law. The
practice and legislation of inheritance law, for instance, is still based on Sharia law.
However, Tunisia also has a very progressive interpretation of religion and an
influential political and religious figure, Ghannouschi, who underlines the compat-
ibility of Islam with democracy and human rights (Pickard 2011: 644).
In this context, any references to religion or Sharia in the constitutions of
Muslim-majority states are also important to consider. Today many constitutions
in countries with predominantly Muslim populations make some reference to
Islam. This is illustrated, generally, either in the preamble, or in the form of the
determination of a state religion, the principle that legislation conforms to the
principles of the religion, or conditions to be met by the head of the state. Many
constitutions also limit the scope of certain rights and freedoms out of respect
for Sharia (Dupret 2016, 238–239). During the constitution-making process in
Tunisia, debates and conflict also mostly centred on the question of religion and
the place of religion in the constitution. Debates about whether Sharia law
should be mentioned in the constitution marked the first years of the constitu-
tion-making process. An internal Ennahda draft text stated that Sharia law
would be a “source among sources” of legislation. However, after the left-
leaning Ettakatol party threatened to withdraw its support from Ennahda’s
governing coalition and to bring down Jebali’s government if Sharia law was
referenced in the constitution, Ennahda backed down and the August 2012 draft
of the constitution contained no reference to Sharia (Darin 2015, 1031). The final
draft of the constitution was the product of a consensus which differed broadly
from the first draft, as described by leftist Popular Front MP Chafik Ayadi:
There is the pre-Brahmi Association constitution and the post-Brahmi Association consti-
tution. When you go back to the first constitution you can see it has nothing to do with the
current constitution in relation to established human rights. In the first one, you see a
constitution – we can say without exaggeration – that establishes a religious society. It has
nothing to do with international human rights, whereas the second one guarantees the
coexistence of all Tunisians whether they are Islamist or secularist.13
13 Interview conducted with Chafik Ayadi in November 2017.
The Protection of Human Rights 13
Brought to you by | School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/25/19 12:26 PM
To reach this consensus and to establish a constitution which satisfied almost all
political actors and enabled Tunisians to live together was a risky step for
Ennahda as it touched on deeply sensitive issues within the party. Ms Labidi
illustrated this in an interview given in February 2018, giving details of how
Ennahda and particularly Ghannouchi took steps during the constitution-mak-
ing process to made concessions in order to establish the necessary institutional
capacities, even risking a crisis within the party:
Conservative and secularists started from two different points, which were also sometimes
contradictory and in conflict. The majority of Ennahda MPs wanted the constitution to refer to
Islamic principles and values. Yet the other side wanted a reference to human rights in their
universality without any cultural or religious exceptions. When this battle between secularists
and conservatives was polarised … Sheikh Ghannouchi … took a very audacious step; I don’t
know if he consulted the Shura Assembly of Ennahda before taking it but actually I think he
didn’t. He made a declaration that was beneficial for Tunisia and for the constitution-making
process. He declared that we were not going to mention Sharia or reference Sharia in the
constitution, and we would just keep Art 1 of the 1959 Constitution … as this article contains
enough reference to Islam. After making this declaration he called the Shura Assembly to vote
on it … I was concerned that my colleagues in the party might say no. This would provoke a
serious crisis in the party, but thankfully a clear majority was in favour of Ghannouchi’s
declaration.14
The final consensus reached has produced two very important articles, Articles 1 and
2, which satisfied both Islamists and secularists. Most of the secular and religious
political actors agreed to keep Article 1 of the 1956 Constitution, which explicitly
states that “Tunisia is a free, sovereign and independent state, whose religion is
Islam” and Article 2 which states that “Tunisia is a civil state, based on citizenship,
thewill of the people and the rule of law”. Islamists regarded Article 1 as sufficient as
it describes the religious identity of the country, with no need to insert a special
provision declaring Islam themain source of legislation. They also had no objections
regarding Article 2. Ghannouchi defended these two articles by saying:
In the constitution we have two things that cannot ever be changed: that Tunisia is a
Muslim state, and that it is a civil state. These two things cannot be changed because we
do not think they are contradictory. We believe that they can be compatible.
Leftist Fadhel Moussa illustrated the position of the other camp and underlined
the importance of these two articles when he said the following:
Let’s also remember that ‘modernists and secularists’ were in the power at that time, in
1959. They accepted Article 1, because they knew the sensibilities of this country and were
aware of how strongly the majority of Tunisians were attached to Islam and Arabness …
14 Interview conducted with Mahrazia Libadi in February 2018.
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For 50 years Tunisia functioned under Article 1 and we maintained it: we had no problems
between secular and religious elements in our country. However, this new constitution is
better than the previous one in this regard, because we have added Article 2, which …
means that Tunisia is a civil state based on citizenship and not on belief … The constitution
is also based … on the supremacy of law, not on the supremacy of Sharia. So we can say
that we have, in Article 2, an important safeguard.15
Readiness to Discuss Controversial and Costly Issues:
LGBT Rights
Ennahda was willing to contribute to the protection of human rights in the
country. However, this was a challenging task as the expectations and demands
of Tunisian citizens needed to be balanced with the ideological and religious
standpoint of the movement. In this regard Ennahda was struggling with chal-
lenges posed by wide-ranging liberties in the post-uprising era. On one hand
they were expected to address these issues as one of the key political actors in
the country. At the same time, they were supposed to consider heterogeneous
interests within the party and justify their positions in line with their religious
and ideological principles.
The position of Ennahda with regard to LGBT rights is remarkable in this
regard. Although I never directly asked any of my interviewees about their
position on LGBT rights, they addressed this issue either to demonstrate their
high degree of readiness to protect human rights or the progressive stance they
took on liberties compared to other actors in the country. The statements on
LGBT rights are also important since they have the potential to cause costly
political conflict within Ennahda, considering that the movement is not homo-
genous and includes some radical Islamist members. It should also be under-
lined that Ennahda does not need to act rhetorically regarding LGBT rights, as
this is a taboo issue in the country regardless of the political background of the
parties. Relatively progressive statements on LGBT rights such as these by
Ennahda members are rarely made in Muslim countries or by other Islamic
parties, and they were welcomed by people from different political factions as
illustrated in the following statement from an interview with the president of the
Youth Can Organisation, Zyna Mejri:
There is something different about the Ennahda party that is not the same as it was in 2011.
I mean, they changed a lot, which is a good thing, and despite the fact that I am not a
friend of the party, for now I would say that it is the only party adopting values in line with
15 Interview with Fadhel Moussa in November 2017.
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the Tunisian condition. We feel this when the head of the party, as an Islamist party, says
that he was in favour of LGBT rights.16
Mejri is referring to a media interview in which Ghannouchi stated that the forced
anal examination of LGBT people17 may be considered part of a person’s private
life and questioning whether the state or religion must intervene in this.18
Along the same lines, Ennahda deputy Mahrezia Labidi addressed the issue
of LGBT rights when I asked her about differences between secularist and
Islamist actors in Tunisia with regard to the protection of human rights. She
used the issue of LGBT rights as an example in support of their progressive
stance on human rights, telling the following story:
The French Minister of External Affairs was having lunch with civil society representatives
in Tunisia. Among the representatives there was a young man representing homosexual
organisations. Each civil society representative of course described the situation in Tunisia
and expressed his. This young man spoke about not having equal rights in Tunisia and he
asked for more rights and for equal treatment as a Tunisian citizen from a sexual minority.
The French minister replied to the young man, ‘I understand that you suffer especially due
to the opposition of Ennahda, the religious party,” and the young man replied we were in
fact the most understanding group who did not even want to criminalise them. We are the
most progressive on this issue.
In relaying her support of LGBT rights, the Ennahda member also referred to
constitutional guarantees for the rights of Tunisian citizens. In this regard we
can say that there was a willingness to protect rights by enabling institutional
capacity for this purpose. For instance, Ennahda MP, Imen bin Muhammed
defended LGBT rights (with the exception of the right to marriage) with the
following statement:
When we talk about homosexuality, in my opinion – even though I am from a political
party which has a religious inspiration – we cannot discriminate against someone based
on their sexual orientation, because rights are guaranteed in the constitution regardless of
religion, gender, belief or any other topic. So, we cannot discriminate against someone
because of this, but we cannot give them the right to get married – you cannot do this –
because our act of marriage is based on a religious principle, not a dual system based on
civil and religious ceremonies.19
16 Inteview conducted with the president of Youth Can, Zyna Mejri in November 2017.
17 Article 230 of Tunisian Panel Code – dating back to French colonial era – criminalises
consensual same sex relations with up to three years’ imprisonment. People suspected of
engaging in same sex relations are forced to undergo anal examinations to conclude if the
accused person has engaged in homosexual conduct (Human Rights Watch 2016b).
18 Interview with Selim Kharrat in November 2017.
19 Interview with Ennahda deputy Imen bin Mohammed in November 2017.
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Decline in the Willingness and Capacity Building for Human
Rights Protection
The economic growth problems, political associations and terrorist attacks, and
growing fear for the Islamisation of Tunisia threatened to push the transitional
process of the country into a major crisis (Quamar 2015, 280). In particular, the
failure to address the simple everyday needs like rubbish collection, high
unemployment rates and political instability has created an atmosphere of
nostalgia for the Ben Ali era. There was a desire for more experienced traditional
politicians to lead the country, which made Nidaa Tounes an attractive alter-
native for the voters. Nidaa Tounes was founded in 2012 by Beji Caid Essebsi, an
88-year-old politician who served both Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali. It was
formed in opposition to Ennahda, drawing from Ben Ali officials, and Ben Ali-
era parties, and leftist union leaders (Teyeb 2014). Nidaa Tounes won the
majority of the seats in the National Constituent Assembly (85 of the 217
seats), followed by Ennahda winning 69 seats, in the 2014 elections, which
took place amidst a political crisis and economic challenges. As Nidaa Tounes
fell 24 seats short of a simple majority, a grand coalition between Nidaa Tounes,
Ennahda and two minor parties (The Free Patriotic Union and the Afek Tounes)
was formed (Quamar 2015, 281–282).
Although the coalition has not managed to address many of the Tunisia’s
challenges, such as poor economic growth, security sector reform, and judi-
cial reform, important steps in addressing the rights of women have been
taken during this recent period. For instance, in July 2017 the Tunisian
Parliament adopted a comprehensive law addressing violence against
women. Following this, in September 2017 the directive prohibiting the mar-
riage of Tunisian women to non-Muslim men was also lifted by the Justice
Minister (Human Rights Watch 2018). However, some of the legal steps taken
during this period have threatened a backlash regarding capacity building in
the field of the legal framework. One of the most controversial issues was in
relation to the reconciliation bill, which gave amnesty to officials from the
Ben Ali era involved in corruption cases provided they repaid the stolen
money. This bill was defended by Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda members as
a necessary step to be taken in order to make the country’s economy work
again by creating funds and recovering billions of dollars. Although the bill
was harshly opposed by the civil society and political opponents because it
would harm the whole transitional justice process, it was passed in
September 2017. The struggle of the Nidaa Tounes to push the bill reinforced
the view that the party is a continuation of Ben Ali’ s Constitutional
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Democratic Rally (RCD), and led to a decline in the credibility of Ennahda as
a partner of a corrupt alliance (Yardımcı-Geyikçi and Tür 2018, 794).
During the grand coalition period, the ongoing security threats continued to
challenge the basic rights and freedoms of the Tunisian people. In particular,
after the 2015 terrorist attacks, the government of Tunisia started to roll back
freedoms. It imposed a state of emergency and passed a counterterrorism law
that allows authorities to detain terrorist suspects without charges and a lawyer
for 15 days (Fassihian 2018). Moreover, in 2017 the police union lobbied for a bill
on the “repression of attacks against the armed forces”, which was pulled
because of strong domestic and international pressure (Amnesty International
2017). However, the bill returned to the agenda because of the suicide bombing
in Avenue Bourguiba in October 2018. Another worrisome development with
regard to human rights is the decline in the productive collaborative work
between CSOs and the government due to the growing trust gap between the
two; particularly worrisome is the CSOs law 30 of 2018, which foresaw the
compulsory national registration of institutions, including CSOs (Yerkes 2018).
This period is described by Zyna Mejri with the following words:
I would describe the period from 2011 until 2014 as the happy, dreamy period of post-
revolution Tunisia. Everyone was dreaming of change, everyone was dreaming of democ-
racy and then from 2014–2017 the real fight started. It was a fight not to gain new rights but
to keep our old rights. For instance, when the president proposed a law that gave
amnesties to corrupt people who we had been fighting in the 2011 revolution … After
2014 we realized that we had to keep fighting to protect the rights we had gained, because
the elected government or the elected president was trying to turn back the human rights
situation in Tunisia …
As has already been pointed out, one of the most significant problems affecting
human rights protection in the country since 2014 has been the failure to
establish institutions guaranteed by the constitution and dedicated to the pro-
tection of human rights. The government has failed to appoint any members of
the constitutional court, which is vital for a functioning human rights regime,
and has stopped the work of the Truth and Dignity Commission (IVD).
Specifically, the major coalitional partner, Nidaa Tounes disdained the work of
the IVD, and attended none of the public hearings held by the commission
(Yardımcı-Geyikçi and Özlem 2018, 794). Although some of the constitutional
commissions could not be activated because of the lack of financial resources,
thus restricting the capability of the state for capacity building and slowing
down the establishment of some very necessary institutions such as the consti-
tutional court, the lack of consensual support for the establishment of the
constitutional court and for the work of the Truth and Dignity Commission has
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created the suspicion that the Ben Ali era officials were the real cause for this
slowdown. Nidaa Tounes is mostly seen as a continuation of the old regime
because it inherited not only the organizational infrastructure of Ben Ali’s RCD,
but also its leading figures (Yardımcı-Geyikçi and Özlem 2018, 796).
This argument that the return of political figures from the former regime has
led to the slowing down of the establishment of the institutional framework
needed to protect human rights, or in some cases the cessation of the function-
ing of some already-established institutions, is mostly expressed by opposition
political actors and civil society actors. For instance, Chafik Ayadi, a Popular
Front MP, articulated how the human rights situation in the country has been
negatively affected by the return of the Ben Ali era politicians with the following
words:
A lot of faces from the dictatorship which were somehow responsible for limiting freedom
of expression are coming back and there is an atmosphere of a lack of tolerance right
now.20
The return of old faces from the Ben Ali era in the coalition of Nidaa Tounes’
party was also seen by the civil society actors as the main reason for the change
of the positions of Ennahda with regard to human rights protection in the
country and readiness to support the necessary institutional framework for the
protection of human rights. For instance, the vice president of Al-bawsala Selim
Kharrat criticized Ennahda members for not being genuine in their support of
human rights and using human rights as a tool to legitimise themselves.
During the period from 2011 to 2014, the Islamists … used international human rights
discourse to differentiate themselves from the Ben Ali era and to say they were the political
party that would ensure, protect and promote human rights. However, we can observe that
this discourse has shifted since the last elections in 2014 because Ennahda is now in a
coalition with Nidaa Tounes, and Nidaa Tounes is like a newer version of Ben Ali. So
Ennahda has changed its political discourse and their behaviour to be more in harmony
with their new partner.21
Kharrat also pointed to the passivity of Ennahda’s policy on the transitional
justice process and on their alliance with Nidaa Tounes:
Ennahda was one of the main political parties to promote and help draft the law that made
it possible to organically implement the transitional justice process but now, since the last
elections, Nidaa Tounes has made a lot of cuts and weakened this process. Nidaa Tounes is
the main political party that would be in danger due to the transitional justice process. So
20 Interview with Popular Front deputy Chafiq Ayadi conducted in November 2017.
21 Interview conducted with Selim Kharrat in November 2017.
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they are fighting with the institution (the Truth and Dignity Committee). Ennahda has said
nothing to support this institution or to offer another opinion about the transitional justice
process.
Recent reports also refer to numerous challenges in consolidating human rights
protections in Tunisia, notably the failure to establish key institutions mandated
by the constitution, such as the Constitutional Court, and the adoption of laws
that threaten democratic transition, such as the administrative reconciliation law
which grants amnesties to state officials accused of corruption (Human Rights
Watch 2018). Freedom House, in its latest review of Tunisia, also refers to the
influence of officials from the old regime as one of the main obstacles hindering
full democratic transition. Tunisia’s freedom rating also decreased from 1 to 2,22
and suggested a downward trend, due to the growing pressures on the political
system from powerful elements of the former regime and repeatedly postponed
municipal elections (Freedom House 2018). As the UN Rapporteur Ahmed
Shaheed states in his recent report, the tests that Tunisia faces include economic
challenges, the need to establish key institutions mandated by the constitution
such as the Constitutional Court, the existence of laws which violate constitutional
standards, and the threats of violent extremism and terrorism (Shaheed 2018).
At the time of writing this article, the Constitutional Court anticipated in the
2014 Constitution, has still not been established, nor have its members been
formally appointed. Ennahda deputy Ms Libadi outlined the situation and
addressed the problem of coalition members’ unwillingness to establish the
institution in an interview conducted in February 2018 when she said the
following:
We have voted for the law, we have set the criteria for choosing members and as a member
of the Parliamentary Committee for Rights and Liberties I am simply angry: I am terribly
angry and disappointed with the behaviour of the president of the assembly now. He is
moving slowly as if he wants to prevent the establishment of the Constitutional Court. Yes,
my party is in the coalition but I am not at all satisfied with the slow speed of establishing
constitutional bodies, especially the Constitutional Court. In this year’s opening session of
the parliament the president of course once again committed himself to establishing the
Constitutional Court this year. Honestly, if we fail to establish the Constitutional Court this
year it will simply be a shame. Shame on Tunisian democracy.23
The Tunisian Parliament’s March 2018 vote against a seven-month extension of
the mandate of the Truth and Dignity Commission (IVD) deactivated a signifi-
cant institution established after the uprisings, sending a strong signal that
22 Freedom Rating Explanation: 1 =most free and 7 = least free
23 Interview conducted with the Ennahda deputy Mahrezia Labidi in February 2018.
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transitional justice and human rights protections in Tunisia have slowed down.
The IVD was created by the Transitional Justice Law in 2013 both to investigate
human rights violations, covering the period from Tunisian independence in
1956 onwards, and to provide compensation and rehabilitation to victims. The
law gave the IVD a four-year term with the possibility of a one-year extension.
The vote against the extension of its mandate was not the first attempt to block
the work of the IVD, with state institutions and officials attempting to hinder its
progress from the start. Throughout its mandate period there was a lack of
cooperation by government agencies including the Ministry of Interior, which
refused to provide the IVD with access to secret police records, and the military
justice system, which refused to transfer records of military trials related to
human rights violations (Amnesty International 2018).
The president of the Women’s Committee of the IVD Ibtihel Abdellatif
complained about the lack of support by governmental institutions in fulfilling
the Commission’s mandate and said:
Many female victims want to face their perpetrators. They want to be asked for forgiveness,
they want an apology. However in Tunisia so far, the Ministry of the Interior has refused to
allow apologies or to cooperate with us. Unfortunately this process of reconciliation is
facing many difficulties. Many institutions do not cooperate with us. Today, for example,
we held a workshop with the Ministry of Education about how to preserve the memories of
human rights victims and how to educate children about human rights. However, no one
[from the Ministry] came; the minister ordered them not to come. Only UN and IVD
members were at the workshop.24
The parliamentary vote against the extension of the IVD’s mandate was mainly
supported by Nidaa Tounes members, including many political figures from the
old regime, and it came just as the IVD had started referring cases of past human
rights violations to criminal trial (Amnesty International 2018). Ennahda, which
is particularly invested in the IVD’s mandate as most victims are Ennahda
members, declared the vote invalid due to procedural irregularities (Lynch
2018). After the vote Ennahda released a statement in which they underlined
the importance of successfully completing the transitional justice process
(Ennahda 2018), but at the same time they failed to defend the IVD as an
institution. In reaction to and despite the parliamentary vote, the IVD declared
that the extension of its mandate was not a parliamentary affair but its own, and
they confirmed that they would nonetheless continue with their mandate until
the end of year (Truth and Dignity Commission 2018).
24 Interview conducted with the President of the Women’s Committee, Ibtihel Abdellatif in
November 2017
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Conclusion
Tunisia is experiencing a relatively successful transition after the uprisings,
which is not only because of national specificities, such as high literacy levels,
a large middle class and strong civil society, but is mainly due to the fact that
political actors were highly willing to make concessions to reach a consensus
to protect human rights. The potential for secularist-Islamist polarisation of
the country following the uprisings was masterfully controlled by Islamist and
secular actors who promoted the transition process by reaching a consensus
on controversial issues such as the place of religion in the constitution.
Ennahda in particular made several concessions on controversial issues
which were not actually in line with their previous ideological standpoint.
The adoption of the 2014 Constitution, which is in line with international
human rights standards, and the high level of freedoms and liberties provided
after the uprisings positively contributed to the country’s successful capacity
building for the protection of human rights. In spite of the significant security,
economic and legal challenges in the transitional Tunisia, the initial period
after the uprisings witnessed a certain degree of interaction, and a willingness
and capacity to protect human rights which also positively affected the transi-
tion process of the country.
The 2014 elections resulted in a grand coalition which has continued to
seek a constant consensus in order to address the needs of transitional
Tunisia. However, it has failed in addressing the ongoing economic growth
problems and security threats. Moreover, the return of the old ruling elite to
the political scene after the 2014 parliamentary elections gave rise to a decline
in the capacity building. This in turn negatively impacted the human rights
record of the country and also led to a decline in Ennahda’s credibility, with
regard to its willingness to protect and ensure human rights. In spite of the
constructive steps taken to establish a stable institutional framework follow-
ing the uprising, Tunisia today is still struggling with serious difficulties in
making the established framework function due to a lack of both political will
and adequate funding. The economic difficulties and security concerns are
also restricting the ability of the government to establish the necessary legal
and institutional framework for the protection of human rights. In some cases,
even the government is enacting laws which harm the basic rights of Tunisian
citizens. However, what is more worrying is a serious decline in the will-
ingness of political actors to establish the institutions necessary for the
effective protection of human rights as outlined in the constitution.
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